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Chairman: Mr. von WAGNER (Germany)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA ITEMS (continued)

1. Mr. JACOB (India) said that the past few years had witnessed far-reaching changes on the international scene, creating new imperatives for the international disarmament and security agenda. The disappearance of bloc politics, East-West tensions and ideological differences coupled with the increasing interdependence of the world had contributed to the emergence of growing desire for the creation of a safer world order.

2. 1993 had been an eventful year for disarmament because, apart from the signing of the Convention on Chemical Weapons, which eliminated an entire class of weapons of mass destruction, the United States of America and the Russian Federation had concluded the START II agreement. It was to be hoped that START II would encourage a process of nuclear disarmament not merely restricted to the United States and Russian Federation but extending to all the nuclear weapon Powers and looking towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

3. Against that background, the Action Plan proposed by India five years ago at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament for achieving the elimination of all nuclear weapons in three stages was still relevant. Beginning in 1965, India had repeatedly urged that non-proliferation must be addressed in all its aspects in order to avoid a nuclear disaster. The fact that the world had to contend with the possibility of the smuggling of fissionable material, the clandestine transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorists and the problem of what to do with nuclear-weapon technology scientists was a result of the fact that all efforts at non-proliferation had been directed towards preventing non-nuclear States from acquiring nuclear weapons while nuclear weaponry had proliferated both quantitatively and qualitatively in geometrical proportions in the nuclear-weapon States.

4. India was opposed to signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in its present form because it was discriminatory. A new international understanding and consensus on what constituted non-proliferation was urgently required so that the pursuit of a global approach to non-proliferation which was universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory could be attempted. If the international community was capable of reaching an accord to ban chemical weapons there was reason to believe that, given the political will, it could achieve a similar agreement to ban nuclear weapons.

5. As in the past, India would during the current session of the General Assembly propose a resolution calling for a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as a necessary first step towards the elimination of those weapons and the prevention of nuclear war.

6. India welcomed the call by President Clinton for an international agreement to ban production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes. Such an agreement should be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament and ensure that the fissile material cut-off was universal and verifiable through a non-discriminatory verification regime. Moreover, care should be taken to

(Mr. Jacob, India)

ensure that the agreement did not negatively affect the harnessing of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and civilian nuclear programmes.

7. India welcomed the historic decision of the Conference on Disarmament on 10 August 1993 to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a negotiating mandate. The aim of a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be to prevent the testing of all nuclear weapons and thereby to inhibit in a non-discriminatory way proliferation of nuclear weapons in its horizontal as well as vertical dimensions. It must not, however, be conceived as an instrument designed to curtail technological progress or to perpetuate the division of the world into "haves" and "have nots".

8. The treatment of science and technology in their relationship to disarmament had been less than satisfactory. While, on the one hand, ad hoc discriminatory regimes had been created imposing unilateral restrictions on trade with developing countries in dual-use technology, equipment and material, on the other hand, the negative impact of science and technology on disarmament had been largely ignored. Those tendencies were a major impediment to the economic progress of developing countries and to disarmament.

9. India was concerned that transparency in arms transfers was becoming an end in itself. Transparency should be reflected in the reduction of defence expenditures in per capita terms and as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP). Over the period 1987-1992 India's defence expenditure had declined by 4.68 per cent and in 1992 had amounted to 2.75 per cent of its GDP. India had always stood for curbing excess military expenditures which fuelled the arms race. The aim should be general reduction of conventional arms across the globe to levels dictated by minimum defence needs. An important dimension of transparency in armaments was the illicit arms trade, which was most dangerous because of its destabilizing and destructive effects in fuelling State-sponsored terrorism directed against other countries, subversion and drug trafficking.

10. While recognizing that the regional approach could supplement global efforts in disarmament, it must be noted that the definition of a region should include the full range of security concerns of the countries involved as well as the practicability of the specific measures of disarmament suggested in that context. Each region had to be clearly defined with the full agreement of the participating States. Agreements must be arrived at freely among the States concerned, taking into account the characteristics of the region. Essential prerequisites for any such arrangements were scrupulous adherence to the basic principles of international relations such as non-interference in internal affairs, non-incitement to terrorism, secessionism or subversion and appropriate confidence-building measures.

11. The recently concluded START treaties and the decision to begin negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, together with the call for an international agreement on banning the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes, demonstrated that the nuclear-arms race could be halted and even reversed. The endeavour should be pursued to its logical end for the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament. In that context it would be useful if all nuclear-weapon States could agree to a universal freeze on the future development and deployment of nuclear weapons.

12. Mr. Chong-Ha YOO (Republic of Korea) said that the clearest way a country could demonstrate its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation was to become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

13. The Republic of Korea supported extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Conference. The Treaty was an essential tool for the horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; at the same time, there was a need to redress its unequal nature.

14. In order to halt the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons there had to be an end to nuclear testing. In that connection he welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty by providing the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with a negotiating mandate. Despite the recent test conducted by a nuclear State, the moratorium on nuclear testing should continue to be observed by all nuclear-weapon States.

15. The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was a key mechanism for ensuring the Treaty's effectiveness. He therefore stressed the need for all parties to the Treaty to comply with their obligations under the safeguards agreements, including the acceptance of special inspections.

16. He expressed grave concern over the continuing non-compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its IAEA safeguards obligations. The latest efforts by the international community to resolve the issue had met with further difficulties. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had restricted the ad hoc and routine inspections of IAEA to maintenance.

17. That country's nuclear programme was a threat both to the international non-proliferation regime and to the stability of the region. He called on it to comply with its obligations under the safeguards agreement, in conformity with Security Council resolution 825 (1993) of 11 May 1993 and related resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference. He also stressed the need to implement the Joint Declaration by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which had come into force in February 1992.

18. In the period following the end of the cold war there was an increasing threat of regional conflict. More than ever before, the pursuit of peace and security required the collective efforts of countries towards dialogue and cooperation at regional and subregional level. Major progress had been made in 1993 in the Asia and Pacific region on regional security and confidence-building. The countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) had taken the initiative to institutionalize dialogue on security matters in the region through the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

19. The registration of conventional-arms transfers with the United Nations, a process which had begun in 1993 in accordance with General Assembly resolution 46/36 L on transparency in armaments, contributed greatly to confidence-building at both global and regional level. He welcomed the fact that almost 80 countries had registered their arms transfers, including the five permanent members of the Security Council. Universal participation in the Register of Conventional Arms was the key to its success. At the same time he

(Mr. Chong-Ha Yoo, Republic of Korea)

looked forward to further discussions at global and regional level on the implementation and development of the registration system.

20. The United Nations had proved an effective forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations. His delegation therefore believed that the membership of the Conference on Disarmament should be enlarged to cope with the realities of the changed international environment.

21. Mr. BATIOUK (Ukraine) said that his delegation was convinced that further progress in ensuring nuclear disarmament should remain one of the top priorities in arms-reduction efforts. Ukraine's intention to achieve in the future the status of a non-nuclear-weapon State met with general understanding and support from the international community.

22. As a result of the break-up of the USSR, Ukraine had inherited nuclear weapons deployed in its territory. It was ready to take a reasonable and balanced approach to disentangling the complicated knot of nuclear problems. The basic guidelines of the foreign policy of Ukraine, approved by the Parliament of Ukraine in the summer, stated that having, owing to historical circumstances, become the possessor of nuclear weapons inherited from the former USSR, Ukraine would never sanction their use and excluded the nuclear threat from its foreign-policy arsenal.

23. Because of its efforts to eliminate the nuclear weapons on its territory, Ukraine faced a series of complicated political and technical problems, the most important of which were providing assurances for its national security and the comprehensive financial and economic aid required to carry out the task. So far the nuclear-weapon States had agreed in principle to provide such assurances by means of unilateral political statements. However, it was essential that the security assurances provided should take the form of legally binding bilateral or multilateral treaties between Ukraine and the nuclear-weapon States. The destruction of the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine required an enormous financial outlay, which the national economy could ill afford. It should be borne in mind that neither the Government nor the citizens of Ukraine had any say in the decisions relating to the manufacture and deployment of nuclear weapons in the country. Ukraine now found itself being asked to assume international obligations under the START Treaty, which had been drafted without its participation, but whose implementation would involve it in considerable expenditure.

24. The President of Ukraine had launched an initiative for the establishment of an international fund intended to ensure the development and financing of a programme for the elimination of strategic offensive weapons in the country. As the Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament, Mr. Plusch, had indicated the previous week, the START I Treaty might be ratified before the end of the year, provided that the parliamentarians were given clear explanations as to the arrangements for the elimination of the weapons, compensation and security assurances. Contrary to some of the statements made before the Committee, conditions were not yet altogether ripe for such an event.

25. Ukraine strongly supported the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; it was in favour of its full

(Mr. Batiouk, Ukraine)

implementation by all States parties and would welcome the accession of more countries to the Treaty. Ukraine supported the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) aimed at ensuring comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation guarantees and was ready to apply the relevant IAEA safeguards to all nuclear facilities on its territory or under its jurisdiction.

26. A comprehensive ban on nuclear tests was an important aspect of non-proliferation and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In that connection, Ukraine remained a convinced supporter of the need for the earliest possible ban on underground nuclear-weapon testing.

27. Ukraine had been one of the first countries to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and at present was actively preparing for its ratification. Moreover, it had consistently supported efforts to establish nuclear-free zones and zones of peace and cooperation in various parts of the globe. Such zones would encourage good-neighbourly relations, foster greater trust between nations and make international affairs more predictable.

28. In view of the current situation in Europe, strengthening regional cooperation had emerged as a foremost concern in matters of security. A single all-European security zone could be created once regional stability had been secured in Central and Eastern Europe - an area which would become an essential link in Western European security structures. Efforts towards achieving regional stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe were an integral part of the all-European security strategy. They should include political, economic, military and other aspects of maintaining stability, thereby allowing the European States to conduct an active political dialogue and adopt effective measures to prevent conflicts.

29. As a first step, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe might issue a joint declaration in which they would map out their concerted efforts for strengthening stability and security in the region and proclaim their readiness to join forces in order to achieve that end. The next stage might be the creation of a mutual confidence-building system, through bilateral and multilateral consultations, and the establishment of close regular contacts between heads of State in the region and between ministries of foreign affairs and defence. Those and other ideas had been discussed at the United Nations Symposium on Security, Disarmament and Confidence-Building in the CIS Context, held from 27 to 30 September 1993 in Kiev.

30. One of the most complex and pressing tasks facing the countries of the former Soviet Union was the problem of conversion. In the view of Ukraine, the United Nations should focus its attention on the issue, drawing on its vast potential and experience so as to seek solutions to the problem of demilitarizing the national economy of different States.

31. Ukraine set great store by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and was doing its utmost to ensure its implementation. The Treaty would accelerate the disarmament process in Europe, eliminate any remaining imbalances in armed forces and render the military and strategic situation in the continent more predictable. The transition to lower levels of armaments required transparency in military matters, which would become an important additional

(Mr. Batiouk, Ukraine)

factor in international stability. Ukraine was in favour of ensuring openness in military matters and the exchange of information on the military capability of States. The States Members of the United Nations should provide such information each year on a voluntary basis in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

32. Ukraine attached great importance to the extension of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament and intended to become a fully fledged member.

33. Mr. ADOLFO TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) said that the issue of disarmament remained topical in the changing international political climate. The end of the East-West confrontation had created more favourable conditions for speedier progress in areas such as nuclear disarmament, averting an arms race in outer space and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. He shared the hope expressed by the representative of Ukraine that the latter would ratify the START-I Treaty before the end of the year, and welcomed the significant progress made in the reduction of conventional arms in Europe, which had accumulated the largest weapon stocks.

34. With regard to a total ban on nuclear testing, Venezuela had always been in favour of concluding a treaty on a comprehensive ban on and an end to all experimental nuclear explosions in all environments. In that connection, the mandate to conduct negotiations conferred on the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament was of particular significance. Venezuela joined other countries in supporting the holding of a review conference on the partial test-ban Treaty and considered that the work of such a conference should be parallel with and should complement that of the Conference on Disarmament.

35. The non-nuclear-weapon States welcomed the unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing being observed by the nuclear Powers. However, it was regrettable that the People's Republic of China had violated the moratorium just when it seemed that the climate was right for a permanent ban. It was to be hoped that the tests conducted by China would be the only exception to the general rule.

36. Another important issue was the close link between disarmament and development. Since the end of the cold war, many countries had started to pay greater attention to the question of reallocating the considerable financial, human, scientific and material resources used in the arms industry and using them for social ends. With the entry into force of agreements between the major militarily significant Powers on the reduction of their military arsenals and armed forces, the process of releasing resources and applying them to the social and economic sectors had got under way. As to the conversion of the arms industry, he welcomed the statement by the director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who had stressed the vital importance of harnessing the potential of the defence industry to promote economic growth, thereby signalling a new approach to the issue.

37. In January 1993, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction had been signed by 148 States but ratified by only 4 of them. It was to be hoped that the ratification process would gain momentum, so as to ensure the earliest

(Mr. Adolfo Taylhardat, Venezuela)

possible entry into force of the instrument. Likewise, the Preparatory Committee's work should facilitate the swift establishment of the requisite verification mechanisms and during the preparations due account should be taken of the need to share equally the financial burden incurred by the Organization's activities relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

38. Another issue related to disarmament was the negative assurances of security. Any progress achieved in the area would be of vital importance, particularly in preparing the ground for a conference in 1995 on the review and extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Venezuela hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would commence negotiations without further delay, before the 1995 Conference, on an agreement which would provide the non-nuclear-weapon States with appropriate assurances in that regard.

39. A special session of the General Conference of States members of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) would be held at the end of the following month. It was hoped that Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba would become full States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco at that session. The Treaty of Tlatelolco would thus become applicable throughout the region, which would mean the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, in order to enhance the efficiency of the mechanism, Canada should also adhere to the regime without further delay, as provided for in the Treaty.

40. Despite the fact that the non-nuclear-weapon States regarded the Non-Proliferation Treaty as unfair and its obligations as discriminatory, the Treaty would do mankind a great service and be the mainstay of the international non-proliferation regime. However, the Treaty had also been drafted with the aim of curbing the new nuclear arms race. Accordingly, article VI provided non-nuclear-weapon States with a means of exerting pressure on nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations.

41. In planning for the conference on the review and extension of the Treaty, two points should be borne in mind: on the one hand, the need to extend the Treaty; on the other hand, the importance of its future use as a means of putting pressure on nuclear-weapon States to speed up the disarmament process with a view to concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty and stepping up international cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Venezuela was of the view that a means of reconciling and combining those two goals should be sought. One possible step in that direction would be the decision of the 1995 Conference to extend the Treaty on the same conditions as those attending its conclusion, without specifying the expiry of its validity. The Treaty should still provide for the holding of a review conference on its application every five years as well as a new conference on its extension in 30 years' time. In the meantime, the nuclear-weapon States should issue a formal declaration on their full compliance with their obligations under the Treaty.

42. Miss BUSADEE SANTIPITAKS (Thailand) said that the remaining threats to international security, such as the ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union, had heightened concern regarding the proliferation of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction. Thailand commended the

(Miss Busadee Santipitaks, Thailand)

continued moratorium on nuclear testing by the major nuclear Powers, which it was hoped would result in a lasting ban on nuclear testing. However, Thailand shared the concerns of other countries regarding the nuclear tests conducted recently in Asia.

43. Thailand supported the efforts by the President of the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty and welcomed the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had conferred a mandate on its Ad Hoc Committee to carry out negotiations along those lines.

44. In 1995 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was due to expire, and the States parties would have to decide on its extension, since it was one of the most important international agreements aimed at curbing nuclear proliferation. The question of whether that Treaty should be extended indefinitely depended on the confidence States had in the instrument, particularly those without nuclear weapons. In that connection, consideration should be given to constructive proposals on strengthening the regime provided for under the Treaty, especially those proposals concerning the provision of technical assistance to the non-nuclear member States. However, since the Treaty was an integral part of the general disarmament process, successful negotiations on other aspects of disarmament would pave the way for its indefinite extension.

45. With reference to transparency in armaments, the subject of General Assembly resolution 47/52 L, Thailand considered that such transparency could never be a substitute for genuine arms reduction. The universal and non-discriminatory application of transparency would, however, enhance the ability of the international community to monitor arms transfers throughout the globe. The goals of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms should be clear to all. The security of States would not be compromised by their participation in the process.

46. To eliminate, or at least limit, the emerging and remaining security challenges it was necessary to establish international forums for the exchange of views on security issues among regional groups. It had therefore been agreed at the ASEAN Ministerial Conference, held in Singapore in July, to establish an ASEAN Regional Forum at the ministerial level to discuss regional and international security issues. The first meeting of the Forum would be held in Thailand in July 1994.

47. The transformation of the international political arena had enabled many countries to carry out regional initiatives to promote further dialogue and cooperation. In that connection, his country had, in response to the Secretary-General's report entitled "An Agenda for Peace", organized two series of seminars on ASEAN-United Nations cooperation in peace-keeping and preventive diplomacy, held in Bangkok and Singapore. Participants had included representatives from the region, dialogue partners of ASEAN, and United Nations representatives, who had contributed to a frank exchange of views on important regional issues.

48. Mr. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka) said that the world had witnessed several positive developments in the field of disarmament in 1993. They included the signing by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation of the START II Treaty and the nuclear test moratoriums announced by the United States, the Russian Federation and France.

49. The most significant step taken by the international community in 1993 had been the signing of the Convention on Chemical Weapons, which had within a short period of time attracted 150 signatories. That Convention was a product of multilateralism based on the principle of the sovereign equality of States. It was also testimony to the efficacy of the Conference on Disarmament.

50. Sri Lanka was committed to general and complete disarmament. It was happy that the nuclear arms race of the 1970s and 1980s had abated. There was still a need, however, to scale down nuclear arsenals as rapidly as possible and to take practical steps to phase out all nuclear weapons.

51. His country had been heartened by the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. That decision fulfilled the long-held objective of the international community to take the first meaningful step towards the total elimination of nuclear tests in all environments. It was the first opportunity for the Conference to be involved in negotiating a treaty on nuclear weapons. It should commence negotiations in 1994, with a view to completing the draft treaty as soon as possible. He acknowledged that it was no mean task: in addition to the legal and political issues that had to be resolved, the issue of verification, which was of crucial importance, had to be dealt with. The Conference should therefore be prepared to work inter-sessionally so as to finalize the work within the allotted time-frame.

52. With 157 States parties, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was by far the most widely adhered to arms-control agreement. Sri Lanka had been one of the first signatories from the South Asian region. It therefore had a profound interest in ensuring the strengthening and the longevity of the Treaty. It was important to be aware of shortcomings in the implementation of the Treaty and to deal with them squarely, with a view to securing universal adherence. Every possible step should be taken to ensure the participation of those countries which had not yet acceded to the Treaty.

53. As a demonstration of its commitment to making the 1995 Conference a success, Sri Lanka had offered to provide a candidate to preside over the Conference. It believed that Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala had the necessary expertise, diplomatic experience and competence to contribute to the success of the Conference.

54. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons remained a subject of crucial importance. Sri Lanka believed that the most effective assurance in that regard was complete nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Until such time as those objectives were attained, immediate measures should be taken to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. It was his country's firm opinion that such measures should be taken through a

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

multilaterally negotiated, legally binding international agreement, rather than on the basis of unilateral declarations.

55. Sri Lanka welcomed South Africa's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its cooperation with IAEA. While it supported the strengthening of the verification capabilities of IAEA under the Treaty, it hoped that the Agency would also expand its capacity and resources for cooperation with member States with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

56. The reserves of plutonium and highly enriched uranium that had accumulated as a result of bilateral disarmament agreements were also cause for concern. The international community had yet to devise an international mechanism to monitor those materials, which constituted a latent threat of nuclear arms proliferation. It would perhaps be advisable to adopt effective arrangements for the storage of such material, preferably under the supervision of IAEA. Such a move would allay concerns that that material could fall into the hands of unauthorized parties, including terrorist organizations. The eventual goal should be to reach agreement on the complete cessation of production of fissionable material.

57. Transparency in armaments could serve as an effective confidence-building measure only if it guaranteed equal and balanced rights and responsibilities of all States participating in the regime. At present, Sri Lanka was preparing its response to the questionnaire that had been circulated in connection with the preparation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. His delegation believed that the Register should be gradually expanded to include all categories and types of destabilizing arms, including weapons of mass destruction.

58. As a result of the excessive stockpiling of armaments during the cold war, there were now open markets for weapons. All types of armed groups had access to such military hardware. Elaborate international systems existed to fund and deliver the weapons to various trouble spots, thus aggravating ongoing conflicts and generating new ones. As long as such illicit arms flows proliferated, political efforts undertaken at various levels, international preventive diplomacy and national political reconciliation efforts would not be successful. Practical and immediate action should be taken to enhance cooperation in that area. If the international community continued to be inactive, then military dictators, terrorists and other groups would have no incentive to participate in political negotiations and in the democratic process. In that connection, Sri Lanka fully supported Colombia's proposal that an item entitled "International arms transfers" should be included in the agenda for the next session.

59. Sri Lanka attached great importance to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In that regard, his delegation shared the views expressed by the Secretary-General in his report (A/48/221).

60. The question of the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace had been under consideration by the First Committee and the General Assembly for many years. Sri Lanka welcomed the new phase of cooperation which had emerged as a result of the end of the cold war. However, given the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean, it was essential to take

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

appropriate steps to promote peace, security and stability in that region, so as to permit the States of the region to devote their attention to the welfare of the people and to the development of their countries.

61. One important question relating to the Conference on Disarmament was that of the expansion of its membership. His delegation commended the tireless efforts of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament to work out a set of measures, which had received the support of the majority of the members of the Conference on Disarmament. Sri Lanka hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would succeed in reaching consensus on the proposed package.

62. Mr. KAMUNANWIRE (Uganda) said he was gratified to note that, with the end of the cold war, the United Nations was now at the forefront in addressing issues of international peace and security. He welcomed the parallel bilateral and multilateral efforts that were being pursued in that area. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), the decision of the United States of America to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing until 1994, the declaration by the Russian Federation that it would not resume testing even if other parties did, and the pledge by France that it would not be the first to resume testing were all further proof of the commitment of the nuclear Powers to non-proliferation.

63. Uganda was encouraged by the enthusiasm shown by members of the First Committee to work towards a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and welcomed the statement of the United States Government that it would support a draft resolution to that effect during the current session. As a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Uganda would continue to participate actively in the preparatory process for the 1995 Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to review and consider extending that Treaty. It was important to remove the imbalances in the present Treaty so that a universally acceptable, non-discriminatory regime could be established.

64. The end of the cold war had heralded a new promise in international peace and security. Unfortunately, that promise had not yet been realized in many parts of the world. Instead, new areas of conflict had emerged. It was incumbent upon the First Committee to devise ways and means of addressing the root causes of many current conflicts throughout the world.

65. His delegation welcomed the restructuring of the First Committee as part of the larger goal of restructuring and revitalizing the activities of all United Nations bodies. The process of restructuring and streamlining the Committee's agenda should ensure the necessary balance between matters of international peace and security and questions relating to disarmament.

66. Uganda endorsed the Secretary-General's "Agenda for Peace", in particular his suggestion that those countries which were negatively affected by the imposition of economic sanctions on other States under Security Council resolutions should consult the Security Council regarding such problems. Practical measures had to be taken to alleviate the negative economic effects of sanctions.

(Mr. Kamunanwire, Uganda)

67. Conflicts in many parts of Africa emphasized the importance of the United Nations in completing regional confidence-building and conflict resolution efforts. Events in Rwanda and Liberia clearly testified to the fact that regional efforts could produce positive results. On the other hand, the inability of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the countries of the subregion to come to the aid of Somalia called for urgent and concerted efforts to establish a mechanism with the capacity to resolve conflicts at the regional level before they began to threaten international peace and security. Uganda hoped that the Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament, supported by the United Nations, would begin functioning in the near future. His delegation welcomed the decision of OAU to establish a mechanism for the conflict resolution.

68. Mr. TANG (Cameroon) said that, despite the complexity of the problems which had emerged since the ending of the cold war, the recent positive developments in the maintenance of international peace and security marked a turning-point in the history of mankind. In that connection the exceptional progress achieved in disarmament deserved special mention. The signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Paris in January 1993 and the conclusion of the START II Treaty were giving a new impetus to the efforts of the international community to reverse the arms race.

69. The continuing moratorium on nuclear tests, which must be comprehensive, was an element of that progress and had been consolidated by the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to conduct negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. By putting an end to the qualitative arms race such a treaty would strengthen the non-proliferation regime and prepare the ground for the renewal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 for an indefinite period.

70. Such developments would enhance the status of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations. However, it was regrettable that the Conference had been unable at its latest session to reach a consensus on the question of expansion of its membership. The number of States currently participating in the work of the Conference as observers exceeded the number of its members. Therefore, the obstacles to the adoption of the judicious and balanced proposal of the Special Coordinator on the issue should be removed. The Conference would then be able to adapt its structure to the changed international situation.

71. Cameroon had welcomed the decision of the Government of South Africa to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency and fulfil its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

72. The role which regional organizations must play in conflict settlement was now acknowledged. The decision of the heads of African States adopted at their Cairo Summit in July 1993 provided for the creation of a machinery for the prevention and settlement of conflicts.

73. At the subregional level and in accordance with General Assembly resolution 46/37 B, the Secretary-General had announced on 28 May 1992 the establishment of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. That

(Mr. Tang, Cameroon)

decision, which was the culmination of the efforts of the 11 countries members of the Economic Community of Central African States (Angola, Burundi, Gabon, Zaire, Cameroon, Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Central African Republic, Chad and Equatorial Guinea) to promote confidence, security and development in the subregion, had led to the adoption of a non-aggression pact by the Central African States in Libreville in September 1993. The pact represented an extremely important element in a set of measures which included the establishment of a subregional training centre for peace-keeping personnel and the gradual reduction of the armed forces and military budgets of the States of the subregion. The States of Central Africa had thus manifested their determination to create an environment of peace and security which would contribute to the subregion's economic and social progress.

74. Great interest had been aroused by the statement in the Committee on 21 October 1993 by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs in which he had outlined the measures being taken by the Secretary-General to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. In that connection the evaluation of the activities of the United Nations regional peace and disarmament centres provided an opportunity to review their role and to provide them with the necessary human and financial resources for performing the tasks entrusted to them. That applied in particular to the Lomé Centre, whose structure must be brought into line with the demands of the African situation.

75. Mr. JAAKSON (Estonia) said that fundamental political changes had broken the global stalemate and reduced global tension, only to give way to local conflicts. However, local conflicts could be resolved if the United Nations acted with determination and in unison. The Estonian delegation believed that the United Nations was the best and fairest enforcement mechanism in the world. Estonia applauded the continuing efforts of the United Nations in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. The fundamental question was whether the world community was ready collectively to resolve conflicts by decisive action.

76. The security of Estonia was intimately tied to the stability of the whole region which was at present very precarious. Nobody knew how the economic transformations in the countries of the region would end. A single major failure in that regard would be sufficient to bring to power the forces which formerly held a great part of the world in terror and whose actions had led to the unrelenting development and production of arms.

77. The obvious insecurity in the region had led to a search for new and effective mechanisms for crisis management and conflict prevention such as the CSCE forum for security cooperation and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Those mechanisms were still in the developmental stage but were providing new approaches to the resolution of security issues on a regional basis. In the Forum for Security Estonia was in favour of the creation of a regional security round table which would give impetus to disarmament and to security and confidence-building measures, enhance the effectiveness of consultations and cooperation on security matters, and promote dialogue as a means of reducing the risk of conflict. Estonia believed that its participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council was a natural development in the general integration process

(Mr. Jaakson, Estonia)

in Europe which might eventually lead to Estonia's joining all the existing institutions. The Estonian delegation therefore welcomed the announcement that NATO was considering the expansion of economic, political and military ties with all the States of the region.

78. Estonia's active participation in various security arrangements had not eliminated the threat that hung over it and its neighbour, Latvia. The question of defending the human rights of the Russian-speaking population in areas formerly controlled by the Soviet Union was a pretext for the acquisition of political and economic advantages for Russia. The illegality of stationing troops on foreign soil without the consent of the State concerned had been recognized by the United Nations through the unanimous adoption in 1992 of General Assembly resolution 47/21. The reluctance to withdraw and the lack of a firm timetable for the complete withdrawal of its remaining troops had forced Estonia again to sponsor a new resolution in the General Assembly.

79. His country had joined with 150 other States in signing the Convention on Chemical Weapons early in 1993 and was now preparing the documentation for its speedy ratification by its parliament. Estonia also considered that not indefinitely extending the NPT would have very serious consequences for it and the whole world and that unqualified extension was the only sane solution.

80. Mr. RODRIGUE (Haiti) said that important successes had been achieved in recent years in the areas with which the First Committee dealt. Among those successes were the signature in Paris at the beginning of 1993 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons, which undoubtedly constitute a significant advance. His delegation hoped that the Convention would soon come into force and thus make possible the definitive elimination of that category of weapons. Another important step in the direction of arms limitation had been the signature on 3 January 1993 of the START II Agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation for the reduction of the nuclear arsenals. As the implementation of the START II Treaty depended on that of the START I Treaty, his delegation called on the parties concerned to show their good sense and goodwill by fulfilling the obligations undertaken under the Lisbon Protocol.

81. His delegation welcomed the decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Haiti, which was a party to the NPT, was in favour of the indefinite extension of the Treaty, which would help reduce the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

82. The important initiative of the nuclear Powers establishing a moratorium on their nuclear tests had been welcomed by the international community. His delegation appealed to China, which had recently carried out nuclear tests to join the moratorium announced by the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States and France. His delegation also welcomed the regional initiatives intended to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and the progress made towards the definitive entry into force in the Latin American region of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

83. There was no doubt that the use of conventional weapons had caused the greatest damage and the highest number of casualties throughout the world.

(Mr. Rodrigue, Haiti)

Thus, after the coup against the Haitian Government on 30 September 1991 the military and its civilian accomplices had killed more than 4,000 people with the help of military weapons. Haiti's painful experience showed that in the absence of democracy and the institutions and structures of lawful government, and with unlimited access by national armed forces to conventional weapons, the international community must take the measures of preventive diplomacy necessary to reduce the possibility of armed conflict. For those reasons, Haiti considered that the Committee should give serious attention to the problem of the excessive proliferation of conventional weapons which brought death to the populations of the developing countries.

84. The situation created after the coup d'état had prevented Haiti's Government from participating in various international agreements but once the constitutional order was fully restored his Government would take the necessary measures at the national level for adherence to those agreements, particularly those relating to conventional weapons.

85. Although arms limitation was at least a means for decreasing threats to collective security, in order to establish real peace it was necessary to deal with the causes of conflicts. The system of collective security international society was striving to create would be effective only if all countries abided by the universal principles of justice, democracy and respect for human rights.

86. Mr. HAN DAE SONG (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of the Republic of Korea had had no right to refer in his statement to the existence of a nuclear threat from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The Republic of Korea should acknowledge openly that while attempting to arouse the suspicions of the international community concerning the nuclear programme of the DPRK it was itself engaged in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The manufacture of nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea was assuming a threatening character. According to press reports, South Korea had, in 1985, completed the construction of an experimental centre which could be used for receiving plutonium. On 19 April 1988, Mr. Fischer (IAEA) had said that South Korea was able to produce nuclear weapons. It was also known that South Korea had concluded an agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the acquisition of plutonium. The rulers of South korea should accept in deeds and not words the realities of the new post-cold-war era and focus their efforts on achieving progress in the negotiations for the signature of an agreement of principle and a joint declaration on the creation of a nuclear-free-zone on the Korean peninsula.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.